Who Becomes an Entrepreneur? Labor Market Prospects and Occupational Choice by Poschke, Markus
IZA DP No. 3816
Who Becomes an Entrepreneur?


























zur Zukunft der Arbeit
Institute for the Study
of Labor
November 2008 
Who Becomes an Entrepreneur? 


















P.O. Box 7240   
53072 Bonn   
Germany   
 
Phone: +49-228-3894-0  







Any opinions expressed here are those of the author(s) and not those of IZA. Research published in 
this series may include views on policy, but the institute itself takes no institutional policy positions. 
 
The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn is a local and virtual international research center 
and a place of communication between science, politics and business. IZA is an independent nonprofit 
organization supported by Deutsche Post World Net. The center is associated with the University of 
Bonn and offers a stimulating research environment through its international network, workshops and 
conferences, data service, project support, research visits and doctoral program. IZA engages in (i) 
original and internationally competitive research in all fields of labor economics, (ii) development of 
policy concepts, and (iii) dissemination of research results and concepts to the interested public.  
 
IZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. 
Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be 







Who Becomes an Entrepreneur? 
Labor Market Prospects and Occupational Choice
*
 
Why do some people become entrepreneurs (and others don't)? Why are firms so 
heterogeneous, and many firms so small? To start, the paper briefly documents evidence 
from the empirical literature that the relationship between entrepreneurship and education is 
U-shaped, that many entrepreneurs start a firm “out of necessity”, that most firms are small, 
remain so, yet persist in the market, and that returns to entrepreneurship have a much larger 
cross-sectional variance than returns to wage work. Popular models of firm heterogeneity 
cannot easily account for the U-shape or for the persistence of low-productivity firms. The 
paper shows that these facts can be explained in a model of occupational choice between 
wage work and entrepreneurship where agents are heterogeneous in their ability as workers, 
and starting entrepreneurs face uncertainty about their project’s productivity. Then, if agents’ 
expected productivity as entrepreneurs is increasing and not too concave in their ability as 
workers, the most and the least able individuals choose to become entrepreneurs. This 
sorting is due to heterogeneous outside options in the labor market. Because of their low 
opportunity cost, low-ability agents benefit disproportionately from the ability to pursue only 
good business projects and abandon low-productivity ones. This also makes them more likely 
to immediately abandon a project for a new one. Data from the NLSY79 gives support to 
these two predictions. Individuals with relatively high or low wages when employed, or with a 
high or low degree, are more likely to be entrepreneurs or to become entrepreneurs, and 
spend more time in entrepreneurship. Among entrepreneurs, more of the firms run by 
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Why do some people become entrepreneurs (and others don't)? Why do so many rms fail so
early? Why are rms so heterogeneous? With these questions in mind, this paper explores the
occupational choice between wage work and entrepreneurship when people are heterogeneous
in their ability as workers, and startups dier in productivity. A substantial number of peo-
ple choose to become entrepreneurs. In the U.S., for instance, the ratio of entrepreneurs to
entrepreneurs plus wage and salary workers is 12.8%, using CPS data for 2003 cited in Hipple
(2004). This rate is even higher in most other industrialized economies (see Blanch
ower 2000).
Of course, who becomes an entrepreneur may matter a lot for aggregate productivity and welfare.
Before modeling the occupational choice, I assemble and review some relevant facts about
entrepreneurship from the empirical literature. First, do the most or the least able become
entrepreneurs? A priori, this is not clear, and depends on what type of rm one thinks of.
Lazear (2005, p. 650), for instance, puts it this way:
It is tempting to argue that the most talented people become entrepreneurs because
they have the skills required to engage in creative activity. Perhaps so, but this 
ies
in the face of some facts. The man who opens up a small dry-cleaning shop with two
employees might be termed an entrepreneur, whereas the half-million-dollar-per-year
executive whose suit he cleans is someone else's employee. It is unlikely that the shop
owner is more able than the typical executive.
The reverse might be true. As necessity is the mother of invention, perhaps en-
trepreneurs are created when a worker has no alternatives. Rather than coming from
the top of the ability distribution, they are what is left over. This argument also 
ies
in the face of some facts. Any ability measure that classies John D. Rockefeller,
Andrew Carnegie, or, more recently, Bill Gates near the bottom of the distribution
needs to be questioned.
Indeed, Section 2.1 shows that upon closer inspection, it results from the empirical literature
on entrepreneurship that when educational attainment is used as a proxy for ability, there is a
U-shaped relationship between entrepreneurship and ability: Self-employment rates are highest
for people with relatively high or low levels of education, and lower for people with intermediate
levels of education. This of course only comes out when not imposing a linear specication for
education. When just regressing the probability of being an entrepreneur on years of schooling,
2results often are not signicant { as may well occur if the underlying relationship is actually
U-shaped.1
The remainder of Section 2 brie
y revisits three better-known facts about entrepreneurship.
Firstly, a substantial fraction of entrepreneurs (more than 10% in the U.S.) make their occupa-
tional choice not to pursue some golden opportunity, but \out of necessity". Secondly, the bulk
of rms are small, remain so, and yet persist in the market. Many are smaller than popular
models of rm entry and survival allow them to be, making structural estimation or calibration
of those models hard. Finally, returns to entrepreneurship have a much larger cross-sectional
variance than returns to wage or salaried work.
In Section 3, I set out a simple and pretty general model that can explain all these facts.
It describes a world where people dier in both productive ability (output as workers) and the
productivity of rms they start, and choose the most rewarding occupation. Whereas productive
ability is known, the productivity of entrepreneurial projects can only be found out by imple-
menting them, i.e. by becoming an entrepreneur. Average productivity of rms started by a
person may however be correlated with his/her productive ability.
Because a project's productivity is not known ex ante, an entrepreneur may happen to start
a low-productivity venture and then abandon it in the hope of starting a more productive project
next time. The optimal continuation policy hence consists in a reservation productivity, similar
to that in McCall (1970) labor market search. Less productive projects are abandoned. This
reservation productivity is higher for more able agents. In Section 4, I show that if prospective
entrepreneurs' expected productivity increases in their ability and this relationship is weakly
convex (or, strictly speaking, not too concave), the most able and the least able people start
rms, with agents of intermediate ability choosing to become workers. (A very weak restriction
on the production function is also needed.) I also show that not only the optimal reservation
productivity, but also the success probability it implies is higher for high-ability agents. This
implies that low-ability agents reject more projects and search longer before accepting one.
The pattern of selection into entrepreneurship arises for the following reason: The cost of
starting a rm is an opportunity cost in terms of foregone wages. This is higher the more
discriminating the reservation productivity policy is. Low-ability agents face low wages and
therefore have a low opportunity cost of starting a rm. As long as they have some probability
of having a reasonably good idea and if entry costs are not too high, searching for that idea
1Lazear, following his observation, then goes on to focus on heterogeneity in the structure of skills, and not in
ability. The potential importance of other dimensions of heterogeneity notwithstanding, the main contribution of
the model proposed in this paper is to explain the at rst sight puzzling entrepreneurship-ability relationship.
3is worthwhile. High-ability agents have particularly high potential benets. But agents of
intermediate ability fall in between, and as a result do not nd it optimal to start a rm.
In considering a setting with two dimensions of heterogeneity, the paper goes beyond the
classic models of entrepreneurial choice of Lucas (1978) and Kihlstrom and Laont (1979). With
only one dimension of heterogeneity as there, it is relatively obvious who will start a rm: the
least risk averse, or the most able entrepreneurs. This however does not square well with the
empirical evidence on entrepreneurship and ability, or even with casual observation. Cagetti
and De Nardi (2006) do consider a model of occupational choice with two dimensions of ability.
However, their entrepreneurial ability is a binary variable, just indicating whether someone is
able to start a rm or not. They then focus on how the possibility of starting a rm shapes the
wealth distribution and the distribution of returns to entrepreneurship when there are nancial
constraints { quite distinct from the role of heterogeneity in this paper.
The model is close to another classic, though: the Roy (1951) model of occupational choice.
Jovanovic (1994) analyzes such a Roy model with known, heterogeneous managerial and working
abilities. The model here extends this by uncertainty about a startup's productivity, and by
agents' ability to search for a good project. Section 5 shows how two crucial dierences, the
fact that one of the occupations considered is entrepreneurship and the introduction of search,
substantially shape the predictions of the occupational choice model. As a result, the model
proposed here matches all the facts presented in Section 2, in particular the U-shaped relationship
between education and ability.
The main predictions of the model are that individuals with relatively high or low ability
are more likely to become entrepreneurs, and that among these, low-ability agents are more
discriminating in their choice of project. The nal section presents empirical evidence on these
predictions, using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY79). I nd that
individuals with relatively high or low wages when employed, or with a high or low degree,
are more likely to be entrepreneurs or to become entrepreneurs, and spend more time in en-
trepreneurship. Among entrepreneurs, more of the rms run by individuals with low wages when
employed, or with a low degree, are abandoned after only a year. These ndings give support
to both of the main predictions of the model.
2 Some facts on entrepreneurship
This section documents several relevant facts about entrepreneurship, some well-known, some
new. Firstly, the relationship between entrepreneurship and education is U-shaped. That is,
4people with very low or high levels of education are more likely to be entrepreneurs than people
with intermediate levels of education. Secondly, there is a substantial fraction of people who
become entrepreneurs \out of necessity," and not to pursue an opportunity. This ts with the
third fact: most rms are small. Most of these rms remain small and are not much more likely
to exit than their larger counterparts. Many existing models have trouble accounting for the
smallest of them. Finally, returns to entrepreneurship have a much higher variance than returns
to being an employee. This emerges robustly from the recent literature on entrepreneurship and
will therefore be reiterated only brie
y here.
2.1 Who becomes an entrepreneur? Entrepreneurship and educational at-
tainment
Are more productive or less productive people more likely to become entrepreneurs? As sug-
gested by the quote from Lazear (2005), either argument might be made, depending on the type
of rm one is thinking of. This also suggests that the answer does not have to be either/or.
This section presents evidence on the relationship between entrepreneurship and ability, with
the following result:
Fact 1 The relationship between entrepreneurship and education is U-shaped, i.e. people with
low or high levels of education are more likely to be entrepreneurs than people with intermediate
levels of education.
Whereas there is an abundant literature on the impact of an additional year of schooling
on wages or salaries of employees, the relationship between entrepreneurship and schooling has
received much less attention, and much less sophisticated econometric treatment. Therefore, I
will simply focus on results in the literature on the proportion of entrepreneurs by educational
attainment.
Studies that look only for a linear eect, e.g. by regressing the probability of being an
entrepreneur on years of schooling, often remain inconclusive. This is also the case for the
meta-study by van der Sluis, van Praag and Vijverberg (2003). The reason for this is that on
closer inspection, as shown below, a U-shape appears: People at the extremes of the education
distribution are more likely to be entrepreneurs than people with intermediate levels of education.
Looking for a purely linear relationship will hide the U-shape and most likely yield insignicant
estimates.
Table 1 summarizes recent evidence. It shows self-employment rates by educational category
from a variety of sources, covering dierent countries and time periods. The columns refer to
5elementary school (E), less than high school (<HS), high school (HS), less than college (<C),
college (C), and advanced degrees (>C). Not all sources report data for all of the educational
categories. More detail on the sources can be found in Table 2.
Table 1: Entrepreneurship rates by education category
educational attainment
data source E <HS HS <C C >C
Borjas and Bronars (1989) U.S., 1980 Census 4.8 4.2 4.6 6.5
Hamilton (2000) U.S., 1984 SIPP 12.6 11.1 12.6 15
Hipple (2004) (unincorporated) U.S., 2003 CPS 9.1 8.7 8.2 7.5 9.1
Hipple (2004) (incorporated) U.S., 2003 CPS 2.1 3.1 3.9 5.5 6.6
Lin, Picot and Compton (2000) Canada, 1994 18.4 13.5 11.4 10.1 11.1 13.2
Schjerning and Le Maire (2007) Denmark, 1980-96 10.9 10.9 7.4 3.6 12.9
Notes: Sources: Author's computations from Borjas and Bronars (1989), Table 2, Hamilton (2000), Table 1,
Hipple (2004), Table 3, Lin et al. (2000), Table 3, Schjerning and Le Maire (2007), Table A.1. Borjas and
Bronars (1989): Results are similar for black and Asian men. Some papers refer to self-employment rates, not
entrepreneurship rates. Yet, as these self-employed can have employees, the term used here seems more apt.
Table 2: Entrepreneurship rates and education: details on data sources
Blanch
ower (2000) micro data from 19 countries, from Eurobarometer Surveys and
General Social Survey, 1975-1996, ages 16-64.
Borjas and Bronars (1989) U.S., 1980 Census: white men aged 25-64, residing in metropo-
litan areas, not employed in agriculture.
Hamilton (2000) U.S., 1984 SIPP: male school leavers aged 18-65 working in the
nonfarm sector.
Hipple (2004) U.S., 2003 CPS: men and women, aged 16 and older.
Lin et al. (2000) Statistics Canada 1994 Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics
(SLID), ages 15-64.
Schjerning and Le Maire
(2007)
Statistics Denmark Integrated Database for Labor Market Re-
search (IDA) and Danish Income Registry (IKR), 1980-1996,
ages 30-55.
The most remarkable feature of the data reported in Table 1 is that self-employment rates
are higher for the lowest and highest levels of schooling, and lower for intermediate levels. Hence,
the relationship between the self-employment rate and educational attainment is U-shaped. This
holds across data sources, time periods, and (some) countries, giving the regularity some support.
6It also holds in the NLSY data used in this paper, as shown in Section 6. The only group for
which it does not hold is the subgroup of the incorporated self-employed. This exception arises
because small businesses are unlikely to incorporate. Using recent data from the new Panel
Study of Entrepreneurial Dynamics (PSED), Campbell and De Nardi (2007) also nd a U-shape
of the probability of being in the process of starting a business with respect to schooling (see
their Figure 2).
Econometric exercises show that these dierences are not simply due to e.g. cohort eects.
The U-shape in education persists when regressing the probability of being an entrepreneur on a
set of demographics using discrete choice models. This is found both by Blanch
ower (2000) in
data across 19 OECD countries, and by Schjerning and Le Maire (2007) in Danish data, using
very ne education categories. Blanch
ower nds that controlling for age, education, gender,
household size, the number of children under the age of 15 in the household and the gender-
specic country unemployment rate, \the least educated (age left school < age 15) and the most
educated (age left school > 22 years) have the highest probabilities of being self-employed"
(p. 488). This pattern is statistically signicant. Schjerning and Le Maire, controlling for
age, wealth, number of children by age, marital status, immigrant status and origin, and the
spouse's self-employment status still nd that the probability of being self-employed is lowest for
the intermediate education categories of post secondary education and a short cycle of higher
education, and higher at the extremes. A linear specication for education would not be able
to pick this up. Evans and Leighton (1989) for instance, using years of schooling as a measure
of education, do not nd it to be signicant when controlling for urban vs rural, experience,
unemployment status, father's occupation, and some sectors. As far as the evidence goes, the
U-shaped relationship between entrepreneurship and educational attainment hence emerges as
a pretty robust fact.
2.2 Why start a rm? Opportunity vs necessity
Are all entrepreneurs out to pursue some golden opportunity? Despite the fact that many large
rms started small, most rms stay small, and yet they persist. In fact,
Fact 2 There is a substantial fraction of people who become entrepreneurs \out of necessity",
and not to pursue an opportunity.
This results from data collected through the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) project
in 47 industrialized and developing countries. The GEM is an academic research consortium led
7by London Business School and Babson College. Its data provide the broadest information on
entrepreneurship across countries.
Table 3: Fraction of entrepreneurs starting a rm \out of necessity" (GEM data)
Western Europe other OECD Latin America
Belgium 10.8% Australia 16.7% Argentina 39.1%
Denmark 6.1% Canada 16.9% Brazil 46.7%
Spain 16.4% Japan 26.3% average 42.9%
Finland 9.7% New Zealand 13.5%
France 23.0% USA 12.3% Asia
Germany 26.5% average 17.1% Singapore 15.7%
Iceland 7.1%
Ireland 16.4% Transition Economies Africa
Italy 13.5% Croatia 37.3% South Africa 39.2%
Netherlands 10.2% Hungary 33.0%
Norway 8.0% Slovenia 19.3%
Sweden 12.6% average 29.9%
UK 13.7%
average 13.4%
Notes: Tabulated data are from the macro overview data of the GEM (micro data is also available). It has been
downloaded from http://www.entrepreneurship-sme.eu/.
The GEM survey targets people aged 18 to 64 years who are involved in some nascent
entrepreneurial activity. The relevant group is identied in the context of household surveys.
Table 3 shows the fraction of people responding to \Are you involved in this start-up to take
advantage of a business opportunity or because you have no better choices for work?" as \have
no better choice." In the GEM data, this is called the Necessity Entrepreneurial Activity Index.
The numbers shown are time averages for the period 2001 to 2005 for the countries where
observations for at least 4 years were available.
Two facts stand out. First, the fraction of entrepreneurs \out of necessity" is by far the
highest in Latin America, South Africa, and Eastern European transition economies. Most likely,
issues of (in)formality play a role here. Secondly, there is a substantial fraction of entrepreneurs
\out of necessity" everywhere, even in industrialized countries. In most countries, the number
is above 10%. The average for industrialized countries is 14.4%. Hence, not all entrepreneurs
are out to innovate or pursue a golden opportunity.
82.3 Most rms are (very) small
Given the presence of low-ability entrepreneurs, combined with a substantial fraction of en-
trepreneurs starting rms \out of necessity", the next fact is not surprising.
Fact 3 Most rms are small. Most of these rms remain small and, conditional on age, are
not much more likely to exit than their larger counterparts.
For instance, in the U.S., 55% of employer rms have less than 5 employees. In addition, there
are around 10 million self-employed. While small rms are more likely to exit, the dierence is
small once age is controlled for (Bartelsman, Scarpetta and Schivardi 2003, Figure 6). Hence,
small rms are there to stay. They are not necessarily future large rms (although of course large
rms tend to start small), nor are they doomed to disappear quickly. They are not simply due to
systematic size dierences across industries either, as e.g. Foster, Haltiwanger and Krizan (2001)
document that within-industry productivity dispersion dominates that between industries.
Recent research attempting to match the rm size distribution has mainly focussed on its
right tail (see e.g. Luttmer 2007, Chatterjee and Rossi-Hansberg 2008), not paying much atten-
tion to the left tail. Indeed, popular models have problems accounting for just how small and
persistent small rms can be. For instance, in settings like that of Hopenhayn (1992) and the
many models based on it, a xed cost or a uniform outside option imply that there is a strictly
positive minimum rm size. In the data, however, this minimum size is zero when measured
in terms of employees. Hence, estimated versions of such models have trouble accounting for
small rms and their persistence. Due to the non-linearity of these models, this may aect other
parameter estimates and predictions. Heterogeneity in outside options could solve that problem,
as shown below in the model.
2.4 Returns to entrepreneurship
Fact 4 Returns to entrepreneurship have a much higher cross-sectional variance than wages.
This emerges very robustly from the recent literature on entrepreneurship (see e.g. Hamilton
2000, Moskowitz and Vissing-Jrgensen 2002). Whereas measurement issues pose serious prob-
lems in comparing the average return to entrepreneurship to that to wage work or to public
equity (Hamilton 2000, Moskowitz and Vissing-Jrgensen 2002, Cagetti and De Nardi 2006),
the dierence in variance is so large, and largely immune to shifts in the mean, that there is no
disagreement on it.
9To illustrate, in an early study, Borjas and Bronars (1989) found that the standard deviation
of log weekly income for the self-employed is up to twice that of wage-earners. Depending on
the measure used for income from self-employment, it is between two and almost four in the
sample from the SIPP used by Hamilton (2000).
These four facts are related. They suggests that: entrepreneurs have very heterogeneous outside
options, so some become entrepreneurs \out of necessity". These may (a conjecture) be mainly
people with low levels of education. The rms they run most likely will remain small, if they
manage to survive. Suppose that some variance in returns to entrepreneurship also arises from
heterogeneous quality of projects. Finally suppose that, while any budding entrepreneur could
end up running projects of varying return, those with higher education would on average run
their projects better, or run better projects. Then it is clear that the fact that entrepreneurs
come from the extremes of the ability distribution implies that the observed post-selection cross-
sectional variance in returns will be high relative to the variance in returns any individual might
face. Hence, selection from the extremes of the ability distribution, arising from heterogeneous
outside options, increases observed variance in returns to entrepreneurship.
The model developed in the next section shows how selection from the extremes can occur
naturally in a pretty general setting. It also matches the other facts. Moreover, it suggests that
one-sided selection models, as usually employed in empirical work, will only capture part of the
selection mechanism.
3 The economy
Time is discrete. The economy consists of a continuum of risk-neutral individuals of measure 1.
People derive utility from consumption, and can earn income either as workers or by running
their own rm. Every period, they retire with probability  > 0, and a measure  of people
newly enter the labor market. When an entrepreneur retires, the rm is dissolved. Employees can
however immediately nd a new job on a competitive labor market. Future utility is discounted
at a rate r > 0. Combined with the retirement probability, this implies discounting future utility
using a discount factor  = (1   )=(1 + r) 2 (0;1).
Firms produce a homogeneous good, which is used as the num eraire. They produce output
with the production function
y(;n) = n
; 0 < 
 < 1: (1)
This production function combines as inputs one manager/owner, who is essential to operate
10the rm, with a labor input of n eciency units. (Any individual can run at most one rm at
any moment in time.) Production exhibits decreasing returns to scale in the only variable input,
labor, so that optimal rm size is nite.2 This could be due for instance to limits in managers'
span of control (Lucas 1978): as activity expands, it becomes more dicult to control, and the
marginal product of the variable factor diminishes. Firms vary in their total factor productivity
; which is constant over time for a given rm.
While rms dier in their productivity, individuals dier in their productive ability a. In
the following, this will be referred to as \ability" for short, to distinguish it from productivity,
which is a rm-level concept. Ability a is observable. Workers are perfectly substitutable in
production; a worker with ability a can provide a eciency units of labor input. Assume that a is
weakly positive and that its distribution in the population can be described by some continuous
pdf with nite, strictly positive mean and variance.
Individuals have the choice between working or running a rm for a living. A would-be
entrepreneur can start a rm by putting into practice some business idea. For the moment,
suppose that there is no entry cost. It is well-documented that it is hard to precisely assess
the quality of a project and of its implementation ex ante, before starting the rm.3 Hence,
assume that prior to entry, a potential entrepreneur faces a known probability distribution of
potential values of productivity  his/her project could have. The precise productivity of a
concrete project, however, is only revealed upon starting a rm.
Timing is as follows. At the beginning of any period, agents face the choice between working
and starting a rm. Ability a being observable, agents know their return to working. People
who already run a rm also know the quality of that project and can take this into account
in their choice. The productivity of a new rm, however, is not known. Only the distribution
of productivities is known, so agents make their decision based on this. If they start a rm,
they learn their project's productivity . They can then either pursue that project and start
production the following period, or abandon the project. As a result, there is an entry cost
in terms of foregone wages: It takes a period to start production, so starting a rm entails an
opportunity cost equal to foregoing a period's wages.
A rm's productivity depends on the quality of its founder's idea and management. Suppose
that more able (higher a) individuals have a tendency to have better ideas, or that there are
2The setting is easy to extend to include a variable capital input. The necessity of the xed managerial input
then still ensures decreasing returns to variable inputs, guaranteeing nite optimal rm size.
3Theoretically, this point has been made many times, see for instance Jovanovic (1982). The clearest supporting
evidence comes from high failure rates of young rms. This is amply documented, for some recent estimates of
survival hazards see e.g. Bartelsman et al. (2003).
11some general skills which are useful both in production and for running a rm. To capture
this, assume that at startup, entrepreneurs with ability a draw their rm's productivity 
from some distribution with cdf a(), where a enters as a parameter. All these distributions
are identical up to a translation of location that is given by a monotonic, twice dierentiable
function g(a). It is useful to dene H() = a0(), where a0 is the a such that g(a0) = 0. Then
a() = a0
f [g(a) g(a0)]g for any a and a0. If g0(a) > 0, higher-ability entrepreneurs draw
from better distributions in a rst order stochastic dominance sense. Higher moments are not
aected by a. Also assume that H is continuously dierentiable and has full support in R.
To summarize, the population consists of individuals of heterogeneous ability a. To make a
living, each of them has the choice between working or running a rm. In case they start a rm,
the rm's productivity  is not known ex ante, but the distribution is known, and improves with
an individual's ability a.
A competitive equilibrium in this economy consists of a wage schedule w(a) and a distribution
of agents over activities such that taking prices and wages as given, agents choose their occupa-
tion optimally, rms choose employment to maximize prots, and the labor market clears. The
rm productivity distribution is directly determined by the distribution of agents over activities
and their optimal occupational choice.
4 Occupational choice
The occupational choice problem has the following basic structure. Workers nd it optimal to
start a rm if this yields higher value than employment. The latter depends on the worker's
productive ability. This is also true for the former, because more able workers tend to run more
productive rms. As a result, not everyone will nd it optimal to start a rm; who does so
depends on the relationship between  and a. Once a rm has been started, the owner will only
pursue the concern if this gives a higher value than either giving it up and looking for a job, or
giving it up and trying out a new project. The former is never going to be optimal: any startup
has the same expected value, so anyone who nds it optimal to start a rm once (rather than
work) is going to nd it optimal again, even if the rst project turned out to be unsuccessful.
The other option of starting a new project, however, implies that entrants will only continue if
they are suciently productive. For someone who realizes that his business idea was not good,
it is preferable to try out a new idea instead.
A starting entrepreneur's problem is thus analogous to a McCall (1970) search problem in
the labor market. Someone who has decided that trying to start a rm is the optimal thing
12to do also has to decide which level of productivity is good enough to continue operating. The
reason is that the entrepreneur can always decide to try a new project next period, at the cost
of abandoning the current one. Let the value of running a rm with productivity  forever be
F(). Let expected rm value be V (a). An entrepreneur who has just realized that his project
has productivity  then has two options: pursue it and get F() next period, or try another
project and get V (a) next period. He is thus indierent between the two actions if F() = V (a).
This denes a reservation productivity R: for draws of  above R it is optimal to continue,
and for draws below R it is optimal to try a dierent project. Firm value at the reservation
productivity satises
F(R(a)) = Efmax[F();F(R(a))]jag = V (a): (2)
The expectation is conditional on a because the entrepreneur's ability determines the distribu-
tion from which  is drawn. Because dierent entrepreneurs face dierent distributions, the
reservation productivity R(a) is a function of a. By standard arguments, this functional equa-
tion in R(a) has a unique solution.
Agents' occupational choice problem then consists of comparing the value of starting a rm,
V (a), to the value of working. Denote the latter by W(a). As a does not change over an
individual's life, agents make the same choice every period, or we can think of them as making
an occupational choice when entering the labor market. With perfectly substitutable labor
inputs and a competitive labor market, the wage w(a) is linear in a, and so is the value W(a)
of working forever. The shape of V (a) then determines the pattern of occupational choice. For
this, the relationship between a and  given by g(a) is crucial.
To derive the shape of V (a), rst rewrite the expression for the reservation productivity in






F(0)   F(R(a)) da(0): (3)
For a detailed derivation, see the appendix. This equation characterizes the reservation pro-
ductivity as the level of  at which the marginal cost and benet of searching another period,
or trying again, are just equal. Trying again entails foregoing the value in hand, given on the
left hand side (LHS) of equation (3). In return, it may result in drawing a productivity 0
higher than the one in hand. This gain is given by the expression on the right hand side (RHS).
Figure 1 plots the two sides of equation (3) against the current draw of productivity, , for the
case of linear F. The cost of searching again increases in the current draw  and is given by
13the upward-sloping line. The benet falls in , as shown for instance in Ljungqvist and Sargent
(2004). The reason is that the higher the current draw, the lower the probability of a subsequent,
better draw, and the lower the marginal gain from such a better draw. The downward-sloping
lines trace out the benet for three dierent levels of a for the case of g0(a) > 0.
current draw of productivity  
 
 
marginal benefit high a
marginal benefit medium a
marginal benefit low a
marginal cost
Figure 1: Determination of the reservation productivity: marginal cost and marginal benet of
drawing again
How do the reservation productivity and entry value vary with a? This clearly depends on
g(a). Note rst that if all agents, no matter their ability, face the same productivity distribution
(g0(a) = 0), the marginal benet of drawing again is independent of a. As a consequence,
the reservation productivity R is also independent of a, as is the value of trying. This value
must be strictly positive for the labor market to clear. Otherwise (if V  0), all agents would
desire to become workers, but there would not be any rms demanding labor. With V > 0
and W(a) increasing monotonically from zero to innity, there is a unique intersection aL at
which V = W(aL). Agents with a  aL start rms, while agents with a > aL become workers.
If everyone faces the same opportunities as an entrepreneur but opportunities in employment
dier, the least able workers choose entrepreneurship.
The more interesting and intuitively appealing case is that in which g0(a) > 0, and more able
workers also make better entrepreneurs, on average. To obtain the shape of V for that case,










F(0 + g(a))   F() dH(0)  MB(;a);
(4)
where  is the productivity draw currently in hand, and 0 is next period's draw. Written
this way, ability a aects the payo and the cuto instead of the distribution. Clearly, by the
properties of the production function, g and H, MB is continuously dierentiable. By equation









F0(0 + g(a)) g0(a) dH(0): (5)
As rm value increases in productivity (F0 > 0), this expression has the same sign as g0(a).
Hence, in Figure 1, an increase in a shifts the marginal benet line up if g0 > 0. As a result,
both the reservation productivity R(a) and the value of trying V (a) increase in a. (If g0 < 0,
both fall in a, resulting again in the least able workers becoming entrepreneurs, as in the case
with g0 = 0.)







F0(0 + g(a)) g00(a) + F00(0 + g(a)) g0(a)2 dH(0) (6)
+ F0() g0(a)2 h(   g(a))
o
where h() = H0(), the pdf associated to H. The rst two terms in (6) give the eect of the
shapes of F and g on MB, whereas the last one results from the higher probability of exceeding
any given threshold that comes with a higher a. From the assumptions on technology, F00 > 0.
Thus, if g is weakly convex (g00  0), the marginal benet of trying again is convex in a for any
xed threshold . Note that this also goes through if F is linear. The driving factor is that
drawing from a better distribution not only raises expected productivity, but also raises the
probability of exceeding any given threshold. Where a reservation productivity rule is optimal,
this is a source of further gain.
As MB is convex in a for any given threshold , this is also the case for F(R(a)) and thus
for V (a). The implications for the reservation productivity depend on the shape of F. Note
again that the result does not rely on convexity of F or g, it is purely due to the opportunity to
15search, and to reject low draws. (Evidently, convexity of F or g would make V more convex.)4
To obtain the nal results on occupational choice, some last results on the limits of V are
required. First of all, V (0) > 0 as long as 0(0) < 1, i.e. there is some probability of drawing an
 > 0 even if a = 0. This is ensured trivially by the assumption that H, and thereby all a, has
full support in R. Hence, V (0) > W(0) because of the ability to search. Agents with very low
ability become entrepreneurs. However, for the labor market to clear, not all agents can become
entrepreneurs. Together with continuity of V and W, this implies that there is a threshold aL
such that agents with a  aL become entrepreneurs.
At the upper end of the ability distribution, agents become entrepreneurs because V is
convex, unless V asymptotically becomes linear with slope lower than that of W. This does not
occur if either F is convex (as it is under very general assumptions on technology, e.g. 
 > 0
in the present context) or g is convex. By continuity, this implies that there is a threshold aH
such that agents with a  aH become entrepreneurs. While it could be argued that the result
at the top of the ability distribution is driven mainly by convexity of the return function due
to variable inputs (together with g0 > 0), the result at the bottom of the ability distribution is
clearly due to search.5 Figure 2 plots V and W against a. The following proposition summarizes
the results.
Proposition 1 Occupational choice:
a) If g0(a) = 0, the value of starting a rm is independent of ability. Then there is a threshold
aL such that agents with a  aL start rms and agents with a > aL become workers.
b) If g0(a) < 0, the reservation productivity R(a) and the value of starting a rm fall in a.
Then there is a threshold aL such that agents with a  aL start rms and agents with a > aL
become workers.
c) If g0(a) > 0, the reservation productivity R(a) and the value of starting a rm, V (a), increase
in a. If F00()  0 (
 2 [0;1)) and g00  0, V (a) is convex in a.4 Then there are thresholds
aL and aH (aL < aH) such that agents with a  aL or a  aH start rms and agents with
aL < a < aH become workers.
4Also, by continuity, V still is convex with F linear and g slightly concave; so g linear is a stricter bound than
actually required.
5Convexity of the return function and ex ante unknown productivity alone also yield EF() > F(E) by
Jensen's inequality. If for instance g(0) = 0, this would also deliver entrepreneurship by low-ability agents. The






Figure 2: The value of starting a rm (V (a), convex line) and of working (W(a), straight line)
In the latter, most interesting case, entrepreneurship by low-ability agents is due to the ability
to search for a good project, and to abandon bad ones. Entrepreneurship by high-ability agents is
due to entrepreneurs' ability to leverage their productivity by adjusting variable inputs, resulting
in rm value that increases more than linearly in productivity. Said dierently, given sucient
variation in the returns of potential projects, people with very low value of participating in the
labor market can always do better by searching for a good project { where \good" is relative to
their own alternatives, not to other rms. Search puts a 
oor under how low the value of running
a rm can be. As a result, if their own outside option is suciently low, it is optimal for these
agents to continue running rms at the bottom of the economy-wide productivity distribution.
Search matters less at the high end of the ability distribution. More important is the ability to
determine the scale of the business as a function of productivity. This possibility distinguishes
entrepreneurship from other occupations and changes results compared to the standard Roy
(1951) model (more on this below). The crucial economic features driving the result are hence:
heterogeneous outside options, a positive relationship between ability and expected productivity,
the ability to discard bad projects (for low-ability agents), and the ability to choose inputs
(for high-ability agents). The interaction of heterogeneous benets with heterogeneous outside
options generates selection into entrepreneurship from the extremes of the ability distribution.
17Choosing a reservation productivity is equivalent to choosing success and failure probabilities.
An additional result can be derived regarding how these vary with ability a. Consider only
the case of g0 > 0, where agents with higher earnings ability also face better productivity
distributions. (If g0 = 0, the reservation productivity is the same for all a.)
Proposition 2 Success probability: If g0(a) > 0, the optimal success probability 1 H(R(a) 
g(a)) increases in a, and 0
R(a) < g0(a). As a consequence, in the population, entrepreneurs with
high earnings ability reject fewer projects.
Proof. The argument is straightforward for the case of linear F. The proof for convex F is
more involved and is given in the Appendix. Suppose that F is linear. How does the optimal
success probability 1   H vary with a? To start, suppose that it does not vary with a at all.
This means that the change in R(a) exactly compensates the change in g(a) induced by a
change in a. Now consider equation (3) and note that with linear F, the gain from a new draw
depends only on how much this draw exceeds the old one, and does not depend on a, as F has
the same slope everywhere. With the same success probability for all a, by the properties of a,
the probability distribution of these gains does not change with a either. Hence, the marginal
benet of drawing again does not vary with a. The marginal cost F(R), however, does, as
R(a) increases with a. As a result, a constant success probability cannot be optimal. Instead,
R has to be adjusted such that the marginal benet keeps step with the marginal cost. This
can be achieved by raising R by less than the increase in g, increasing the success probability,
thereby increasing the marginal benet more and the marginal cost less than in the case with
constant 1   H. 0
R < g0 implies that 1   H(R   g) increases in a.
To close the model, the rm productivity distribution can easily be obtained by equating
in
ows and out
ows of rms. Let (a;) be the measure of rms of productivity  with an
owner of ability a. This is positive only for a  aL or a  aH (it is optimal for the owner to
start a rm) and for   R(a) (the rm is productive enough so that the project is pursued).
A fraction  of these rms exit every period due to retirement. Entry comes from entrants to
the labor market who choose to start a rm, or from entrepreneurs who previously attempted
entry, but failed to generate a productive enough project. The in
ow into (a;) hence is
f(a)a() + f(a)a()(1   )a(R(a)) + f(a)a()(1   )2a(R(a))2 + :::
=
f(a)a()
1   (1   )a(R(a))
18where a() is the pdf associated to a(). With an out
ow of (a;), the stock is given by
(a;) =
f(a)a()
1   (1   )a(R(a))
(7)
for a = 2 (aL;aH) and   R(a), and zero otherwise.
Note that while the owner ability distribution features two disjoint parts, this does not have
to be the case for the rm productivity distribution. This is of course important, as the empirical
distribution does not have a disjoint support. If aL and aH are not too far apart, some (relatively)
high-productivity rms operated by low-ability people and borderline rms operated by agents
just above aH may have similar levels of productivity, in particular if the variance of productivity
conditional on ability is high relative to the variance of ability in the population. Variation in
the taste for running one's own business and in risk aversion, dimensions abstracted from in the
model, would also help to smooth the owner ability distribution and, as a consequence, the rm
productivity distribution. Note that while they would also help to explain the existence of small
rms (some of them persist because some psychological benets compensate the owner for lower
income), they would not on their own explain the U-shaped relationship between education and
entrepreneurship, so heterogeneous ability and selection remain crucial.
Equation (7) also shows the eect that the ability to reject bad draws has on the rm size
distribution. Given any a, a higher reservation productivity R raises the probability a(R)
of rejecting a given draw. It thereby increases the proportion of rms that ultimately end up
with  > R relative to that fraction without rejection. For any a  aL or a  aH, as starting
entrepreneurs reject low productivity draws, they will eventually end up with a good draw. The
more stringent the threshold, the stronger this \redistribution" of probability mass to the area
above the threshold. While taking time, this benets aggregate productivity.
Aggregate labor demand follows directly from the rm productivity distribution and the
wage. It increases in the number of rms and decreases in the wage. Labor supply is given by
total eciency units of labor of agents with a 2 (aL;aH). As a higher wage makes W(a) steeper
and reduces V (a) for all a, it shifts aL and aH outwards, increasing labor supply. Labor market
clearing thus determines a unique equilibrium wage.
Robustness and extensions. Consider next a few generalizations. The proof of Proposition
1 c) relied on H having full support in R. Relaxing this only aects results in very particular
cases. First of all, bounding  from below clearly preserves 0(0) < 1 and thus the main result.
Bounding the support of H from above may eliminate 0(0) < 1 and thereby entrepreneurship
19by low-ability agents if g(0) is low enough. However, this requires an upper bound on  at 0
or lower for ability-zero agents { a very restrictive assumption. Any higher bound preserves
0(0) < 1 and entrepreneurship by low-ability agents.
Entry costs however, be they administrative or for nancing some sunk investment, may
matter. Without them, the cost of entry consists only in foregone wages. So, suppose that
productivity is only revealed after some entry cost is paid. Then, when evaluating the costs and
benets of trying again, the benet of doing so is reduced, as more entry costs would be due. As
a result, the reservation productivity R and the expected value of entry V (a) are both reduced.
This shifts the thresholds aL and aH outwards. For high enough entry costs, aL may reach the
lower bound of a. Entrepreneurship is attractive to low-ability agents if they can search for a
good project. Entry costs can make search prohibitively costly for them.
Empirically, this may be plausible, but only up to a point, as low-a individuals can choose
low-entry cost industries. Indeed, Lofstrom and Bates (2007) nd that college-educated people
are more likely to enter high-barrier industries, and people with less education are more likely
to enter low-barrier industries. Similarly, Hurst and Lusardi (2004) show that in data from the
1987 National Survey of Small Business Finances (NSSBF) 25% of new rms were started with
less than $5,000 in capital, and the median starting capital provided by the founder was $22,700.
Hence, choice of industry helps overcome entry barriers and preserves the result from the model
without entry cost.
Matching the facts. The model presented here matches all the facts on entrepreneurship
described in Section 2. In particular, in contrast to all other work on rm heterogeneity, it
matches the fact that entrepreneurs are more likely to come from both extremes of the ability
distribution (Fact 1). As a consequence, it explains the prominence and persistence of small,
low-prot rms (Facts 2 and 3). These rms continue in the market because their owners' outside
options in the labor market are even lower. This eect is particularly strong in industries with
low entry costs. Another consequence of selection from the extremes is that the variance of
returns to entrepreneurship is higher than that of wages (Fact 4).
Moskowitz and Vissing-Jrgensen (2002) discuss some alternative explanations for the fact
that a substantial fraction of rms makes little prots, their main candidate being unmeasured
returns. Hamilton (2000) also concludes that these are important. While the presence of un-
measured returns seems plausible and could explain Facts 2 and 3, it does not explain Fact 1.
Steinberger and Hintermaier (2005) argue that low returns can be interpreted as entrepreneurs'
20investment into information acquisition about their own entrepreneurial ability. While their ar-
gument can explain why low returns occur, it cannot explain the persistence of small low-prot
rms. Once the information is extracted, only successful rms should continue.
Section 6 presents further evidence on the main predictions of the model. Before that, it
is useful to consider the relationship to a close relative, the Roy (1951) model of occupational
choice, and to highlight commonalities and dierences.
5 Relationship to the Roy (1951) model of occupational choice
In the Roy (1951) model of occupational choice, the crucial condition governing that choice
relates the correlation between agents' abilities in two sectors to the relative variance of those
abilities.6 In that model, workers choose between two sectors of activity. Payos are known for
each individual. In the population, they are bivariate lognormally distributed, with a correlation
of  between the logarithms of the payos. Let the standard deviations of the logarithm of the
random payos be  and a, respectively, and assume  > a. Then, if =a  1, outputs
are relatively highly correlated, and relatively productive workers tend to choose the sector with
the higher variance.
In the model presented in this paper, the situation is dierent because of search and because
one of the occupations is entrepreneurship. The direct counterpart of the Roy model condition
would involve g0(a), the variance of a in the population, and the conditional variance of .
However, in the Roy model, payos are linear in abilities. Here in contrast, the fact that one
of the occupations is entrepreneurship implies that in that occupation, the payo is convex in
productivity. As a result, as long as g0(a) > 0, there always is a level of ability above which
agents choose entrepreneurship.
At the lower end, search makes the dierence. To see this more clearly, the model could
be brought close to the Roy model by eliminating entrepreneurs' capacity to start again with a
new project and restricting them to accept their rst draw and to stay in business thereafter,
thus eliminating the ability to search (certainly a draconian restriction). By Jensen's inequality,
expected rm value EF(a) then is convex in  and bounded below by F(E(ja)). This implies
that EF(0) > 0 if E(j0) = 0, and low-a agents start rms. However, this is not a very strong
result; entrepreneurship by low-a agents disappears if E(ja) is suciently low. With search,
this does not occur, because what matters is not expected rm value but the probability, or
possibility, of a good draw { bad ones can simply be rejected.
6For an overview of this and related models, see also Sattinger (1993).
21With search and entrepreneurship, as long as there is a positive relationship between ability
and expected productivity (g0 > 0), both the size of g0 and the relative variances of the returns
lose importance. The partitioning of the population into occupations changes substantially.
These simple extensions thus substantially aect the predictions of the model { allowing more
complex predictions, in line with the facts.
6 Evidence
The model presented in this paper has two clear, empirically testable predictions. First, Propo-
sition 1 states that individuals with relatively high or low potential wages in dependent employ-
ment are more likely to become entrepreneurs (if g0 > 0 and g is not too concave). Second,
Proposition 2 states that among these, individuals with low potential wages are more likely to
abandon a project to look for a better one. This section presents evidence on these predictions
using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY79).
The representative sample of the NLSY79 contains observations on 6111 individuals over the
years 1979 to 2006. They are initially between 14 and 22 years old. Being just at the beginning of
their labor market experience, all these individuals face occupational choices, making the NLSY
a particularly suitable data set for analyzing the question at hand. To focus on the occupational
choice, only individuals who are not in full-time education are considered for the analysis.
Table 4 presents descriptive statistics. Wages are real hourly wages in 1983 dollars, de
ated
using the Consumer Price Index published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Observations
below the 0.5th and above the 99.5th percentile of the real wage distribution are trimmed. This
leaves wage data on 5975 individuals. Information on years of schooling is available for 5367
individuals, and information on the highest degree obtained for 5408 individuals.
Clearly, in the data, individuals who choose to become entrepreneurs may not be en-
trepreneurs all of the time. There can be various reasons for this; it may take time to generate an
entrepreneurial idea or, if there are nancial frictions, saving for start-up capital may take time.
Still, for brevity, refer to everyone who ever is self-employed or runs a rm as an \entrepreneur".
This group comprises almost a third of the sample. Its members spend an average of 5 years, or
almost 30% of the time they spend in the labor market, as entrepreneurs. While their average
rm lasts somewhat longer than 3 years, almost half their rms do not make it past the rst
year. In an average year, 5.7% of individuals currently are running their own business, 2.4%
attempt to enter with a rm, and 2% exit.
22Table 4: Descriptive Statistics
mean standard individuals observations
deviation
average wage 7.56 3.82 5975
years of schooling 13.43 2.78 5367
experience 7.85 5.33 5949 113844
ever entrepreneur 0.30 0.46 5949
duration 4.96 4.65 1807
relative duration 0.28 0.30 1807
share of one-year rms 0.45 0.45 1773
average rm duration 3.34 3.17 1784
currently entrepreneur 0.057 0.23 5949 113844
entry 0.024 0.15 5949 111990
exit 0.021 0.14 5949 111990
one-year rm 0.012 0.11 5949 106258
Notes: Entrepreneurs are all individuals who ever are self-employed or run a rm. Duration is number of ob-
servations of entrepreneurship, conditional on being an entrepreneur. Relative duration is relative to total time
spent in the labor market. Share of one year rms is share of rms operated by an entrepreneur that last only
one year. Entry and exit are the proportion of individuals entering or exiting with a rm in an average year.
One-year rms is the proportion of individuals entering with a rm and exiting again within the year. Wages are
real hourly wages in 1983 dollars.
Table 5 shows a breakdown of the highest educational degree obtained for the whole sample,
for entrepreneurs, and for non-entrepreneurs. In the last column, it also shows entrepreneurship
rates for the dierent education groups. As is evident from the graphical representation of the
same data in Figure 3, results from the NLSY are consistent with those from other surveys
reported in Section 2.1: entrepreneurship rates are highest among individuals with relatively
high or low education.
These results are unweighted group averages, comparing groups of very unequal size. The
rst column of Table 6 shows that the pattern persists when taking group sizes into account.
It reports marginal eects from a probit regression of entrepreneurship on education group
dummies. Individuals with intermediate education are signicantly less likely to have tried
entrepreneurship over the sample period. Column 2 reports results from a tobit regression
showing that they also spend signicantly less time in entrepreneurship. The pattern is similar
for 
ows: column 3 shows that individuals with relatively high or low education are more likely
23Table 5: Entrepreneurship by educational attainment
highest entrepreneurs non- population entrepreneurship
degree entrepreneurs rate
LHS 14.4% 10.4% 11.6% 37.3%
HS 55.3% 55.2% 55.2% 30.6%
LC 7.4% 8.6% 8.2% 27.3%
C 17.3% 17.9% 17.7% 30.1%
M 4.0% 6.4% 5.7% 21.2%
P 1.1% 1.2% 1.2% 31.3%
PhD 0.5% 0.3% 0.4% 42.1%
Notes: Degrees are: less than high school (LHS), high school (HS), less than college (LC), college (C), Master's
degree (M), professional degree such as MD, LLD, DDS (P), PhD. The rst three columns show the distribution
of educational attainment within the occupational groups. The last column shows the proportion of entrepreneurs
within each educational group.
Figure 3: Entrepreneurship rate by educational attainment
Notes: Educational groups are: less than high school (LHS), high school (HS), less than college (LC), college (C),
Master's degree (M), professional degree such as MD, LLD, DDS (P), PhD.
24Table 6: Entrepreneurship by educational attainment { regression results
individual individual individual individual
dependent ever is time spent as becomes becomes becomes
variable entrepreneur entrepreneur entrepreneur entrepreneur entrepreneur
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
HS -0.070  -0.791  -0.006  -0.007  -0.004 
(0.020) (0.319) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
LC -0.094  -1.407  -0.009  -0.009  -0.006 
(0.025) (0.466) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
C -0.074  -1.012  -0.003 -0.004  -0.003
(0.022) (0.378) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
M -0.146  -2.707  -0.010  -0.010  -0.011 
(0.025) (0.554) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
P -0.087 -1.060 -0.005 -0.004 0.001
(0.052) (0.989) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007)
PhD 0.040 -0.112 0.004 0.005 -0.005
(0.108) (1.645) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009)
experience/100 0.273  0.356 
(0.033) (0.055)






observations 5314 5314 100076 100076 64961
groups 5314 5314 5314
Notes: Less than high school (LHS) is the omitted group. Degrees are: high school (HS), less than college (LC),
college (C), Master's degree (M), professional degree such as MD, LLD, DDS (P), PhD. Regression by probit
in columns 1 and 3 to 5 (marginal eects reported), tobit in column 2. Standard errors in parentheses. Errors





25to enter entrepreneurship. An exception here are college-educated individuals, for who the entry
probability is not statistically signicantly dierent from that of individuals with less than high
school. The pattern persists when also controlling for experience, computed as the time spent
earning a wage or in self-employment, and for previous self-employment (columns 4 and 5).7
While schooling is of course closely related to potential earnings as an employee, the data
contain a much better measure of this: wages actually earned. In the model, agents either become
workers or attempt entrepreneurship, but never both. However, if for instance it takes time to
come up with an entrepreneurial idea, agents may sometimes be workers, and sometimes attempt
entrepreneurship. This feature is easy to incorporate into the model; occupational choice follows
the same pattern as derived in Section 4, only that agents choosing entrepreneurship have to
wait with entry until they come up with an idea, working in the meantime. But while they work,
their wages re
ect their ability. Then the prediction of the model in terms of earnings ability
directly translates into one in terms of wages: agents with relatively high or relatively low wages
in employment are more likely to become entrepreneurs, while agents with intermediate wages
remain workers.
As wages in employment are observable for almost everyone in the sample (only 3 individuals
in the sample become entrepreneurs while never working as employees), it is straightforward to
test the relationship between wages and entrepreneurship. Crucially, selection is on observables
here. This and the fact that the analysis relies on only few, well-measured variables make
results very robust. In particular, it is not necessary to use information on income obtained
from entrepreneurship, avoiding all the associated measurement diculties amply discussed in
Hamilton (2000), Moskowitz and Vissing-Jrgensen (2002) and Cagetti and De Nardi (2006).
As an aside, note that results here also suggest that studies of e.g. the return to educa-
tion in entrepreneurship obtain inconsistent estimates even if they correct for selection into en-
trepreneurship if they simply let education enter the selection equation linearly. This amounts
to misspecifying the selection equation.
Results for several ways of exploring the entrepreneurship-wage relationship are shown in
Table 7. The rst column shows results from a probit regression of ever being an entrepreneur
on a quadratic in wages. The wage is the average real hourly wage earned by the individual
when not active as an entrepreneur. The quadratic shape is very signicant. Fitted values are
7In a regression of entry on years of schooling (instead of the degree dummies), schooling is not signicant.
It becomes signicantly negative (at the 90% level) when also controlling for a quadratic in experience and for
previous entrepreneurship. (Results in Table 9 in the Appendix.) This is in line with the diculty the empirical
literature cited in Section 2.1 has with nding a stable relationship between education and entrepreneurship, and
underlines the shortcomings of the linear specication of schooling.
26Table 7: Entrepreneurship and wages in previous employment { regression results
entrepreneur enter enter enter
dependent at least time spent as entrepreneur- entrepreneur- entrepreneur-
variable once entrepreneur ship ship ship
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
wage/10 -0.179  -2.238  -0.009  -0.010  -0.005
(0.047) (0.709) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
(wage/10)2 0.055  0.735  0.004  0.004  0.002 
(0.020) (0.297) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
experience/100 0.291  0.162 
(0.073) (0.071)






observations 5949 5949 55966 55966 55966
groups 5898 5898 5898
Notes: Wage is average real hourly wage of individual when in dependent employment in the rst two columns,
and lagged real hourly wage in columns 3 to 5 (all in 1983 dollars). Experience are periods spent either earning
a wage or in entrepreneurship. Regression by probit in columns 1 and 3 to 5 (marginal eects reported), tobit
in column 2. Standard errors in parentheses. Errors clustered at the individual level in columns 3 to 5. Stars
indicate statistical signicance at the 90% (
), 95 (
) and 99% (
) level, respectively.
plotted in Figure 4; it is clear that the probability of ever being an entrepreneur is highest at
the extremes of the wage distribution. Individuals at the extremes of the wage distribution also
spend signicantly more time in entrepreneurship (column 2), and are signicantly more likely
to enter entrepreneurship in any given period (column 3). This persists when controlling for
experience or for previous entrepreneurship. Previous entrepreneurship is strongly associated
with renewed entry. Controlling for it weakens the signicance level of the wage. This is of course
to be expected, as previous entrepreneurship was already driven by the wage and therefore soaks
up its eect.8
The main prediction of the model is thus borne out very well by the NLSY data: individuals
with high or low earnings ability are more likely to become entrepreneurs, and those with

























































































































Figure 4: Predicted probability of ever being an entrepreneur as function of the wage
Notes: Fitted from Table 7, column 1. Wage is average real hourly wage of individual when in dependent
employment (1983 dollars).
intermediate earnings ability are more likely to become employees. Let us now turn to the
second prediction. Proposition 2 says that conditional on entry, entrepreneurs with low earnings
ability are more likely to reject projects. This can be tested using the sample of entrepreneurs
only. Table 8 shows that the data support the prediction: the average wage is signicantly
negatively related to the share of an individual's rms that are active only for a single year
(column 1). The other two columns show that while rms of individuals with high earnings
ability last signicantly longer, this is mainly due to the fact that these individuals abandon less
rms after the rst year, i.e. reject less projects. This pattern is exactly the one that obtains in
the model, with low-earnings ability entrepreneurs rejecting more projects initially, but sticking
to successful ones. In this, it is complementary to the evidence cited in Section 2.3 that exit
rates vary little with rm size once age is controlled for.9
9Table 10 in the Appendix shows that the pattern also holds when using schooling instead of wages. With
both schooling and wages quadratic terms are not signicant; the relationship appears monotonic, as predicted
by the model.
28Table 8: Exit behavior and wages { regression results
dependent share of average average
variable one-year rms rm life rm life
(1) (2) (3)
wage -0.022  0.093  0.039 
(0.005) (0.021) (0.018)
share of -5.746 
one-year rms (0.181)
constant 0.211  2.540  4.900 
(0.039) (0.176) (0.166)
observations 2501 2501 2501
Notes: Sample: individuals who enter entrepreneurship at least once. Wage is average real hourly wage of
individual when in dependent employment (1983 dollars). Tobit regressions (censoring at 0 in column 1 and at
1 in columns 2 and 3). Standard errors in parentheses. Stars indicate statistical signicance at the 90% (
), 95
(
) and 99% (
) level, respectively.
7 Concluding remarks
Entrepreneurs make up a substantial proportion of the labor force, and an important one to
boot, as they employ others. There is substantial evidence, expanded in this paper, that they
are more likely to come from the extremes of the schooling or wage distributions. The main
contribution of this paper is to explain this by heterogeneity of labor market prospects (the
relevant outside option), combined with search for an adequate project. The ability to reject
bad projects puts a lower bound under the value of search. This is particularly valuable to
low-ability agents. Because of the low value of their alternative option, it makes them more
likely to opt for entrepreneurship. High-ability agents benet from the ability to leverage high
productivity by choosing variable inputs accordingly.
Selection into entrepreneurship from the extremes of the ability distribution naturally ex-
plains why the variance of returns to entrepreneurship is so much higher than the variance in
wages. In addition, the model provides a plausible rationale for the existence and persistence of
small rms. Its prediction that low-ability entrepreneurs are more selective in their search for
a good project is borne out well by the data. All these predictions come from a very general
model that was on purpose kept as simple as possible, to make clear what drives results.
Enlarging the model, there are several promising avenues for further research. Policy makers
often have a rosy view of entrepreneurship. Knowing that there is selection into entrepreneurship
from the extremes of the ability distribution puts this into perspective. Some new entrepreneurs,
29but by no means all, are the next Bill Gates (or, in a less glamorous industry, Sam Walton),
creating large enterprises. Many new rms are small, and are going to remain small. To explore
for instance the aggregate eect of entry subsidies for small enterprises or for entrepreneurship
by the unemployed in such a setting, it is crucial to have a model that is able to explain entry
at both ends of the distribution. While it would not be surprising to see that entry subsidies
successfully encourage entry, it is not evident that they help productivity or welfare if many new
entrants stem from the lower end. Another promising application of the model would be to the
analysis of informality, in particular in transition economies and developing countries. (Table 3
shows the staggering extent of entrepreneurship \out of necessity" in some of these countries).
As modeling the frictions inherent in these applications would substantially cloud the clarity of
the exposition, these applications are left for future research.
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32Appendix
A Derivations
Equation (3): Let the cdf associated to  be . Then





















Proof of Proposition 2 Proposition 2 states that if g0 > 0, entrepreneurs with higher a
choose their reservation productivity R such that the success probability (a)  1 H(R g)
is higher. This is shown in the text for linear F. The result then relies on the fact that if (a)
is kept constant, the marginal benet from drawing again is the same for all a. With convex F,
in contrast, the marginal benet of drawing again increases with a even for constant  because
higher a moves the productivity distribution the agent faces to a more convex region of F,
implying higher value gains for a given improvement in the draw of . Still, the same result can
be derived.






F(0 + g(a))   F(R(a)) dH(0) = F(R(a)):











F(0 + g) dH(0) = [1   H(R   g)]F(R): (8)
omitting function arguments wherever this does not risk causing confusion. Again, at the reser-
vation productivity, the expected gain from an additional draw equals the loss from giving up
the draw in hand. This relationship holds for all a. All functions in involved in equation (8) are





F0(0 + g)g0 dH(0)   h(R   g)F(R)(0
R   g0)
= [1   H(R   g)]F0(R)0






F0(0 + g)g0 dH(0) = [1   H(R   g)]F0(R)0
R:
This equation describes how R and the success probability (a) = 1   H(R   g) evolve as a















A Taylor series expansion of the numerators around R up to the second derivative of F yields













1 + (0   R + g)
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R)
F(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+ (0   R + g)2F00(R)
2F(R)
dH(0): (9)
With the production function y = n
, 





























Again, it is immediately clear that g0 and 0
R cannot be equal, as otherwise the left hand side
would be zero and the right hand side strictly positive. g0 < 0
R only worsens this. Hence, it
must be that 0
R < g0.10 Agents with higher earnings ability a choose higher success probabilities
to compensate the higher cost of drawing again.
10With this production function, a longer expansion yields the same result. Inspection of equation (9) shows
that the result may not hold in cases where F
00=F
0 is very large relative to F
0=F at R, i.e. if the convexity of
the value function increases strongly at some . This cannot occur when the production function has constant
elasticity with respect to the variable inputs.
34B Additional tables
Table 9: Entrepreneurial entry and schooling { regression results
(1) (2) (3)
years of -0.029 -0.035 -0.041 
schooling/100 (0.023) (0.023) (0.022)
experience/100 0.301  0.353 
(0.033) (0.054)




observations 99665 99665 64996
groups 5275 5275 5275
Notes: Dependent variable is dummy for entry into self-employment of entrepreneurship. Regression by probit,
marginal eects reported. Standard errors in parentheses. Errors clustered at the individual level. (Groups
indicates number of individuals.) Stars indicate statistical signicance at the 90% (
), 95 (
) and 99% (
) level,
respectively.
Table 10: Exit behavior and wages { regression results
dependent share of average average
variable one-year rms rm life rm life
(1) (2) (3)
schooling -0.030  0.067  -0.003
(0.007) (0.032) (0.028)
share of -5.686 
one-year rms (0.192)
constant 0.457  2.297  5.201 
(0.090) (0.429) (0.383)
observations 2212 2212 2212
Notes: Sample: individuals who enter entrepreneurship at least once. Schooling in years. Tobit regressions
(censoring at 0 in column 1, at 1 in columns 2 and 3). Standard errors in parentheses. Stars indicate statistical
signicance at the 90% (
), 95 (
) and 99% (
) level, respectively.
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